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Abstract: Host city bidding for the Olympic Games appears to constitute a form 
of pro-cyclical irrational investing that leads to multi-billion dollar economic and 
financial shortfalls and budget over-runs with 100% consistency. The utilisation of 
Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) and Credit Cycle to the Olympic Bid 
Cycle sheds valuable light on the irrationality of these practices, highlighting a move 
from stable (hedge) to unstable (speculative) and unsustainable, precarious (ponzi) 
financing over the life-cycle of an Olympic bid. Application of Minskyian theory to 
the Olympic Bid Cycle carries important insights for practitioners and policy-makers, 
extends the analysis of Olympic-Games studies to the post-Classical economics 
realm, and addresses a wider theoretical call for the utilisation of Minskyian theory 
outside of a financial markets context. The article concludes with recommendations 
for further research.
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PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT
The Olympic Games could be considered the 
greatest show on earth, bringing the very best of 
sport to a global audience, inspiring us to be the 
best we can be through the communication of 
Olympic ideals, and engendering national pride 
as we stand behind our athletes in their journey 
from event to podium. Yet Olympic Games always 
overrun (often by $billions), with an amazing 100% 
consistency. Legacy goals and projected increases 
in tourism revenue usually fail to materialise, 
leaving taxpayers responsible for significant 
financial bailouts, which in turn carry the potential 
to negatively impact our economies. So why do 
host cities continue to bid, despite the economic 
and financial risks that hosting the Olympic Games 
entails? Minskyian theory sheds valuable light 
on this compelling and relevant phenomenon, 
offering fascinating and pragmatic insights into 
this practice and providing recommendations for 
future policy and research in this area.
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1. Introduction
When speculative positions must be financed, the terms on which they are refinanced may 
be unsustainable … but it is still better to refinance, and defer the day of reckoning, than to 
admit defeat.
The process of bidding for, and hosting the Games (referred to in this article as the Olympic Bid 
Cycle1), appears to constitute a form of pro-cyclical irrational investing that leads to multi-billion 
dollar economic and financial shortfalls and budgeting overruns (Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012). For 
example, a recent University of Oxford study into the cost over-runs of hosting the Olympic Games 
from 1960 to 2012 (Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012) concluded that hosting the Olympic Games ran over 
budget for host nations with 100% consistency. The average over-run of host city bids was reported 
to be 179% (324% in nominal terms), meaning that Olympic host-city bidding could reasonably be 
theorised to constitute one of the most financially risky mega-projects that a government and host 
city could choose to financially pursue. Why, then, do host cities continue to bid?
Minskyian theory has enjoyed a considerable resurgence of interest in a post-2008 world, given its 
efficacious contribution to the study of irrational investing (1975, 1986, 1996), and it has much to 
add to an understanding of the schism that emerges consistently between initial and final Olympic 
host city bid figures and the consistent failure to achieve beneficial economic outcomes for host na-
tions as a result of hosting the Games. Situating Olympic hosting as a form of irrational investing 
carries genuinely valuable insights for practitioners and policy makers, as it allows the process of 
Olympic bidding to be analysed more extensively via the utilisation of post-Classical economics ap-
proaches. Furthermore, it addresses Galbraith’s call for such engagement; “There is nothing that 
restricts the application of Minsky’s insight to the pecuniary realm. It is therefore astonishing how 
little has been done to extend the basic conceptual framework to other areas of social science” 
(Galbraith and Sastre, in Papadimitriou & Wray, 2011, p. 263).2 Utilisation of a generalized use of 
Minsky’s theories subsequently provides a solid argument for the conceptualisation of Olympic bid-
ding as an act of irrational investing.
2. Irrational investing
The foundations of studies of irrational investing can be traced to what Alan Greenspan termed “ir-
rational exuberance”,3 and in what John Maynard Keynes referred to as “animal spirits”.4 First ad-
dressed by the Scot Charles MacKay in the seminal 1841, Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the 
Madness of Crowds (1841/1980), the study of irrational investing has emerged with strength in the 
relatively youthful academic field of behavioural finance,5 which has been referred to as “perhaps the 
most important conceptual innovation in economics over the last thirty years” (Schleifer, 2012, p. 1). 
Behavioural finance challenges the efficient markets hypothesis by instead attributing much of the 
volatility and anomalies in the market to cognitive bias (for example, belief perseverance, where 
agents persevere an outcome dogmatically even when presented with evidence to support the irra-
tionality of this act (Zehndorfer, 2015, p. 78)) and “herding” (emotionally following the crowd, as op-
posed to utilising empirical data, to make ones investing decisions), which can also be seen to occur 
in the engagement with hosting of mega events (Banerjee, 1992; cited in Rose & Spiegel, 2011).
3. Minskyian theory
Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) adds substantially to the post-classical economics 
field, arguing that crises do not occur as a result of market imperfections or exogenous shocks, but 
instead as a result of an inherently endogenous “boom-and-bust” pro-cyclicality of the market. The 
work of John Maynard Keynes significantly influenced Minsky, as did Schumpeter’s “creative 
destruction”—a cyclical theory of speculative waves and debt deflation that occurred as a natural 
feature of capitalist economies (Minsky, 1975, 1982, 1986, 1996). Minskyian theory offers a fascinat-
ing insight into the pro-cyclicality of irrational investing in Olympic Bid Cycles, the discussion of which 
forms the remainder of this article. For the benefit of the reader, Minsky’s Credit Cycle (Figure 1, utilis-
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ing the 2008 financial crisis as a case study), is subsequently represented in Figure 1, before 
being applied to each stage of the Olympic Bid Cycle.
Minsky identified a taxonomy of financial structures, or units, explaining that during a period of 
financial calm (see Figure 1, “Stability”), and within a robust financial environment, borrowers are, 
for the most part, able to settle the principal and interest payments on outstanding loans (“hedge” 
units). As the presence of profit opportunity leads to new activities and innovations (in the case of 
the 2008 financial crisis, securitization of subprime debt: “boom” and “euphoria” phases of Minsky’s 
Cycle), further stimulating growth, agents become less risk-averse and likely to take on more debt, 
increasing speculative positions. At this point, many “hedge” units become “speculative”, where 
their indebtedness means that their cash flow would enable them to service only the interest on a 
loan.
Speculative behaviour predisposes an economy to greater investment and growth, but requires 
taking on significantly higher levels of debt in order to facilitate that growth. Interestingly, speculative 
behaviour is rife in the Olympic Bid process. For example, Flyvbjerg and Stewart (2012) reported that 
bid versus actual spend data was also not available for 11 of the Games studied: “From a rational 
point of view such learning would appear to be a self-evident objective for billion-dollar events like 
these, but it is not for the Olympics” (Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012, p. 10). A culture of speculative invest-
ment in the Olympic Bid Cycle process has enabled a culture of under-bidding, accompanied by the 
failure to recognise historic losses in bid budgets. Secured by Government guarantees, Olympic bids 
tend to end with the inevitable taxpayer-funded bailouts (similarly to the post-2008 bank bailouts) as 
budgets have simply moved too far from fundamentals to secure a coherent and realistic profit.
At this point, many “speculative” financing units have become “Ponzi”6 financial structures, where 
interest payments alone exceed the units’ cash flow, leading to refinancing or liquidation and/or 
taxpayer-funded bailouts (e.g. Montreal’s 1976 Olympic Games where the cost overrun reached 
796%). At this point, the economy has become inherently fragile with recession, debt deflation and 
a possible economic depression all realistic outcomes in the advent of a shock of some kind (for 
example unexpected asset price inflation): in the case of Montreal, taxpayers were left with a 
Figure 1. Charisma and the 
2008 financial crisis.
*Collateralized debt 
obligations; **Troubled asset 
relief program.
STABILITY (March
2003-June 2006)
BOOM
Seductive nature of 
charismatic rhetoric drives 
the markets upwards, vastly 
increasing mortgage 
acquisitions and traded 
subprime debt, with AAA 
ratings 
   EUPHORIA (June 2006-June 2007)
The ‘madness of crowds’; subprime 
investing continues despite empirical 
data detailing mass foreclosure rates
PROFIT TAKING
(June 2007-August 2008) 
by Wall St CEO’s (e.g. Lehman Bros CEO Dick Fuld), Ponzi 
financiers (e.g. Bernard Madoff) who are aware of toxic nature of 
subprime vehicles
PANIC (August 2008 – 
March 2009)
AAA rated CDO’s* uncovered as 
toxic. Crisis rhetoric of TARP**; 
demonization of short sellers
Stagnant markets lead 
to financial innovation 
(securitization of 
subprime debt) and a 
boom in US housing 
sector
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30-year tax bill. In the case of the 2004 Athens Games, €7bn of the eventual €9bn Euro cost of the 
Games was funded by Greek taxpayers. Sadly, a year later, Greece became the first EU country to be 
placed under fiscal monitoring by the EU, with Greece’s 2004 deficit standing at 6.1% of GDP, a figure 
that stood in excess of twice the EU limit (Malkoutzis, 2012). Certainly, the cost of the Games was a 
significant contributor to the countrys’ economic malaise.
4. The Olympic Bid Cycle: From Hedge to Ponzi financing
In terms of financing, the key stages of an Olympic Bid Cycle mimic those of a financial markets 
boom-and-bust scenario, with Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis & Credit Cycle offering fasci-
nating insight into the shift from hedge to Ponzi financing that has historically taken place through-
out the life cycle of Olympic bids. First, the displacement phase creates an exogenous “shock” or 
displacement, with the IOC’s announcement of the opening of the Olympic bid process. As the Bid 
Cycle moves through boom & euphoria stages, the securitisation of public sentiment, necessary for 
any Bid, is heightened through charismatic rhetoric and a Government-guaranteed conservative 
(yet inaccurate—and thus, speculative) budget that forecasts a significant post-Games economic 
legacy. At this point, budgeting decisions move from hedge to speculation, with budgets exponen-
tially rising as the Bid Cycle progresses. At the peak of the Olympic Bid Cycle—the hosting of the 
Games, public sentiment is highest, with profit taking in emergence (sponsorship income, corruption, 
continuance of strategic under-bid activity). Panic then ensues post-Games, when the extent of fi-
nancial misrepresentation of the budget at Bid stage becomes evident, and the shift to Ponzi-
financing necessitates a taxpayer-funded bailout.
5. Displacement: The bid process opens
In macroeconomic terms, a displacement can be viewed in the context of an Olympic Bid Cycle as a 
“demand shock” (Kasimati & Dawson, 2009, p. 140); or, as conceptualised, through the lens of 
Minsky’s Credit Cycle, the exogenous “shock” or event common to Kindleberger’s conceptualization 
of market bubbles (Kindleberger, 2000). This constitutes the first stage of the Cycle.
In the context of host city bidding for the Olympic Games, this takes the form of the announce-
ment of the bid process by the IOC to which host cities submit Candidature Files. As stated by Rose 
and Spiegel (2011), bidding for the Games signals “that the country is capable and willing to host the 
Olympics through a highly visible international bid for a mega-event … Indeed, the effect of sending 
this signal seems broadly comparable to size in actually hosting the Games” (p. 666). This positive 
economic impact partly explains a decision to announce ones’ candidacy. However, any positive 
economic effects—most notably increases in exports and overall trade—that are associated with 
hosting the Games are evident at the bidding phase only (Rose & Spiegel, 2011)-a fact evident by 
Olympic Games impact reports. Why, then, do candidates choose to proceed beyond an initial can-
didature phase? An answer lies in the strategic benefit to nation states of hosting the Games.
As Galbraith (1961) stated, in the context of the pre-2008 crash housing boom, “The mass escape 
into make-believe, so much a part of the true speculative orgy, started in earnest. It was still neces-
sary to reassure those who required some tie, however tenuous, to reality. And […] the process of 
reassurance—of inventing the industrial equivalents of the Florida climate-eventually achieved the 
status of a profession” (pp. 16–17). Similarly, the repeated practice of Governments in acting as 
guarantors for multi-$m Olympic Games bids, in the absence of a coherent and persuasive economic 
rationale for doing so and with empirical data indicating clearly the likelihood of under-bids and 
economic indebtedness points to a clear case of irrational investing.
It also explains why charismatic rhetoric has played such an emergent role in Games bids. The use 
of sport as a political tool is well documented; as an opiate, a tool for nationalism, a vehicle for social 
change, a vehicle for propaganda, and a promotional tool for politics (Eitzen & Sage, 2009) and it is 
fair to say that charismatic rhetoric, symbolism and imagery has, historically, played a central role in 
the Olympic Bid Cycle. Guttmann (1986, p. 179) argues that governments “collect political prestige 
by staging extravagant sport spectacles” such as the Olympic Games and “bask in the reflected glory 
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of athletic achievement”. The presence of powerful agents with objectives such as these generally 
lead to the emergence of corruption, misrepresentation of financial data and other malfeasant acts 
which tend to emerge later in the Cycle (see Profit taking in Section 7).
Hosting the Games constitutes a political show of strength that requires public endorsement and, 
consequently, strategic underbidding in order that the Bid Cycle might move from the displacement 
(opening of the bid process by the IOC) to euphoria phase (the securing of public support). If “it is the 
economic value accruing to the host that is commonly used as the basis for gathering public backing 
for such events” (Lee & Taylor, 2005, p. 595), then it is reasonable to theorise that underbidding 
(often by $billions) constitutes a strategic decision at early candidature Olympic Bid Cycle stages, in 
part to secure and stoke public acceptance of, and euphoria toward, the Games bid (Cashman, 
2003). This would contribute to the emergence of profit taking behaviour during latter stages of the 
Bid Cycle.
6. Euphoria
The run-up to the 2008 global financial crisis was referred to as “a classic delusion, a madness of 
crowds. We’ve lived through it over and over again”.7 The central role of charisma in fuelling the 
flames of irrational investing actually emerges with some strength8; for example, Weber (1978) 
seminal view that those who “have a share in charisma must inevitably turn away from the world” 
(Weber, 1978, pp. 1113–1114). Certainly, it is a commodity relied upon substantially throughout the 
history of Olympic bids.
Utilisation of charismatic rhetoric and imagery at this stage of the Olympic Bid Cycle is necessary 
(i.e. references to history and tradition, emphasis on a collective identity, reinforcement of a collec-
tive efficacy, a focus on the leaders’ similarity to followers, discussion of values and morals, refer-
ences to hope and faith and appeals to the self-efficacy of followers (Davis & Gardner, 2012, p. 919)) 
in order to continue to engender public support. By this point, the Olympic Bid Cycle has moved from 
displacement to a peak of euphoria, with vast budgetary increases leading to a move from hedge to 
speculative, and potentially, Ponzi financing. For example, all post-1984 Olympic Games (i.e. post-
commercialization) led to major taxpayer funded shortfalls: the $1.9bn 2002 Salt Lake City Games 
were 80% funded by taxpayer, the $1.23bn 2010 Vancouver Games cost the taxpayer $1.23bn, and 
the London 2012 Games created a $14bn deficit.
7. Profit taking
As stated by Kindleberger and Aliber (2005), “the implosion of an asset bubble always leads to the 
discovery of fraud and swindles” (p. 143). Profit taking carries historic precedent within the context 
of the Olympic Games—for example, the recent arrest of multiple Kenyan high-ranking officials who 
are alleged to have stolen in excess of £6m of equipment and athletes’ expenses earmarked for the 
Rio 2016 Summer Olympic Games, the votes-for-sale scandal involving Bulgarian IOC member Ivan 
Slavkov and bidding for the 2012 Summer Games (uncovered by Panorama reporters) and the exten-
sive bribery and corruption that surrounded the Salt Lake City Organizing Committee in relation to 
their bid to host the 2002 Winter Games.
It has been argued that decisions to host the Games must reflect decisions taken “out of naivety 
or self-interest” (Rose & Spiegel, 2011, p. 652), particularly given the negative economic impact that 
have arisen from hosting the Games (Owen, 2005). It could therefore reasonable be theorised that 
hosting the Olympic Games was a decision often taken in self-interest: that is, to serve the political 
or financial interests of a political party or leader, or of key sponsors or financial backers (ultimately 
at significant cost to the taxpayer). It could not, presumably, constitute a position taken out of na-
ivety, given the wealth of empirical data available to potential bidders that identifies, historically, the 
negative economic and financial ramifications of hosting the Games. As a result, one might reason-
able theorise that strategic under-bidding for the Games represents a form of profit taking at the 
earliest stages of the Bid process, as it represents a conscious decision to misrepresent financial in-
debtedness to taxpayers.
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8. Panic
In the words of Warren Buffett,9 “Only when the tide goes out do you see who’s been swimming 
naked”. When an asset bubble bursts, it constitutes that moment where CEO’s, fund managers, and 
individuals involved in fraudulent, incompetent, insufficiently transparent or malfeasant activity 
(e.g. Bernard Madoff, former NASDAQ-Chairman and architect of a multi-$bn Ponzi scheme) face 
being stripped of their power.10 The turning of the tide from euphoria to panic, when an Olympic Bid 
Cycle reaches “win” and post-Games stage, is evident when Games budgets rise inexorably, when 
post-Legacy promises fail to materialise and when public funds become strained in a bid to meet 
Games-related targets: “We dismiss as implausible the idea that economic fundamentals (e.g. 
transport infrastructure) relevant for trade have been improved by both hosts and unsuccessful 
candidates alike during the run-up to a serious Olympic bid” (Rose & Spiegel, 2011, p. 667).
9. Summary
Entering into an Olympic Bid Cycle appears to constitute a form of irrational investing that leads to 
economic and financial shortfalls and overruns with 100% consistency (Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2012). 
Hosting the Olympic Games constitutes an act of irrational investing by host nations, given that it 
historically requires a shift from hedge, to Ponzi financing, because it relies heavily on the use of 
charismatic rhetoric for the public to support it, and because a wealth of empirical data supports the 
notion that it will lead to negative economic consequences for taxpayers.
In addressing the earlier-cited critiques of Galbraith and Sastre (in Papadimitriou & Wray, 2011, 
p. 263), this article identifies the way in which Minsky’s theories hold significant value for the study 
of Olympic host city bidding. This article ultimately represents the first application of post-classical 
economics theories to the study of Olympic host city bidding as an irrational act of investing, utilising 
charismatic theory as a further tool of analysis. Ultimately, it provides a salient argument for the 
conceptualisation of Olympic Games bidding as a form of irrational investing, and for the application 
of Minskyian11 theories to the process as a means of shedding further light on the pro-cyclical shifts 
from hedge to Ponzi-financing that take place throughout an Olympic Bid Cycle.
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Notes
1. Cycle refers to the lifecycle of the bid, from initial bid 
announcement stage to post-Games stage.
2. The authors discuss the need for a “generalized Minsky 
moment” that takes key conceptual components of the 
theory—such as the notion that “stability is destabiliz-
ing” and applies these components in a broad way to 
other fields, such as international relations. Utilization of 
Minsky’s theory is thus undertaken using a “generalized” 
approach of this nature.
3. A term coined by Alan Greenspan in a 1996 speech en-
titled “The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic 
Society”.
4. A term created by economist John Maynard Keynes in 
his seminal 1936 work The General Theory of Employ-
ment, Interest and Money. Macmillan Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, for Royal Economic Society in 1936.
5. Behavioural finance can be defined as the analysis of 
what happens when agents fail to act rationally, fail to in-
corporate new information into their behaviour, or make 
choices that are not rationally consistent with maximiz-
ing expected utility (Barberis & Thaler, 2002, p. 2).
6. Minsky identified a taxonomy of financial structures, or 
units, explaining that during a period of financial calm, 
within a robust financial environment, borrowers are, for 
the most part, able to settle the principal and interest 
payments on outstanding loans. He referred to this as 
“hedge” units. As the presence of profit opportunity 
leads to new activities and innovations, further stimulat-
ing growth, agents become less risk averse and likely 
to take on more debt, increasing speculative positions. 
At this point, many “hedge” units become “specula-
tive”, where their indebtedness means that their cash 
flow enables repayment of the interest on loans but 
not of the principal. Speculative behaviour predisposes 
an economy to greater investment and growth (and, 
thus, indebtedness to finance such growth) leading 
to ultra-speculative behaviour as the economic boom 
becomes a bubble. This leads many “speculative” 
financing units to become “Ponzi” financial structures, 
where interest payments alone exceed the units’ cash 
flow, leading to refinancing or liquidation. The economy 
has become inherently fragile and may result in an 
economic recession, debt deflation, and, possible 
economic depression in the advent of a shock of some 
kind (for example unexpected asset price inflation). The 
excessively leverage of Bear Stearns (40:1), Merrill Lynch 
(32:1), Morgan Stanley (33:1) and Citi (33:1) in 2008 and 
the banks inability to meet capital requirements follow-
ing the subprime bust provide an excellent example of 
such Ponzi financing and the dangers inherent to it. “… 
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capitalism is inherently flawed, being prone to booms, 
crises and depressions. This instability, in my view, is due 
to characteristics the financial system must possess if it 
is to be consistent with full-blown capitalism” (Minsky, 
1982, p. 278).
7. CEOs and Market Woes: Is Poor Corporate Governance to 
Blame? Wharton University of Pennsylvania, December 
10th, 2008: Accessed at:  
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/ceos-and-
market-woes-is-poor-corporate-governance-to-blame/.
8. A concept explored at length by the first author of this 
article, to which the reader is directed for further eluci-
dation (Zehndorfer, 2015).
9. Warren Buffett, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway and one of 
the world’s most success investors.
10. NB. Ponzi financing in Minsky’s parlance is not an illegal 
act, whereas in the case of “Ponzi schemes” the term 
denotes fraud.
11. Minsky’s (and other behavioural finance and post-
Keynesian institutionalist—i.e. post-classical econom-
ics).
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